Introduction
National oil companies are not cut of one cloth. Many NOCs are politicized, bureaucratic, and hardly capable of even maintaining their current production levels. Some are just shells for employing foreign contractors or joint venture partners. An even smaller group of NOCs is technologically capable, well-managed, and run along economic criteria. By the judgment of most people in the industry, Saudi Aramco, the largest oil company in the world, is one of the latter. 1 Although Saudi Arabia is not a country most observers immediately associate with lean and clean management, Aramco's role as the kingdom's greatest modern institution seems unassailable. Hardly a Saudi and practically no foreigner today is aware
that Aramco is what it is because of a number of historical decisions which could have been taken differently -and which many contemporaries expected to be taken differently, much to Aramco's detriment. Saudi Arabia was close to taking a course which many other oil exporters took, entrusting its upstream oil assets to an opaque, politicized local institution that was supposed to replace foreign-created Aramco.
In October 2005, a small note appeared in the local paper Arab News announcing that the government-owned General Organization of Petroleum and Minerals, Petromin, would be dissolved and its assets taken over by Aramco. 2 No further explanation was
given. Petromin at the time had long ceased to play an active role in Saudi economic development, its last visible presence being faded signs in the vicinity of some old petrol stations. But as incidental as it appeared, the little note indicated the closing of the last act in a long and twisted saga which was at the very core of Saudi state-building, a saga in which Petromin once was the lead actor, and Aramco its main antagonist. At stake was nothing less than which organisation would become Saudi Arabia's national oil company, and -more importantly -who would control it.
It turned out to be a battle to death. The outcome was uncertain for many years, but as readers will have guessed, Aramco eventually won. This paper tells the story why, recounting it from forgotten Petromin's perspective, 3 an organisation that was meant to be national champion of industrialisation, a truly national oil company, and an international refining giant -great ambitions which were, one by one, thwarted. The fates of Aramco and Petromin differ from those of most other NOCs in a way that is very instructive to comparative historians.
The paper is part of a larger project that analyses how conflicts and coalitions among a small number of princes and commoners shaped the modern Saudi state as we know it today. 4 The Petromin story is yet another reminder of how contingent the shape of the modern Saudi state is, and how many of its features are consequences -often unintended -of personal rivalries and ambitions at earlier historical junctures.
At the same time, this paper is a contribution to the comparative literature on NOCs, a long neglected field which has recently seen a number of significant publications. 5 Saudi Arabia's peculiar situation of having had two parallel NOCs makes the kingdom an especially interesting object of comparison. I take Aramco and Petromin as two radically different, but typical representatives of a larger universe of NOC cases. Aramco emerged as the unchallenged national monopolist in oil production, refining and distribution. I will conclude with comparative observations on NOC development.
The Actors
Like the history of many other parts of the Saudi state, the story of Petromin is to a large extent the history of a few crucial members of the Saudi elite, both royals and commoners. Ever since the creation of modern bureaucracy in Saudi Arabia, princes and the commoners around them have been linked through patron-client relations: long-term, deep and unequal links of fealty. Royals provide access to power, resources and status, whereas the commoners provide loyalty and defend the interests of their patrons in state and society.
These ties have been keeping elites with seemingly divergent interests -princes and technocrats -tightly knit together for more than half a century. In their diversity, these links are reaching deep into the state apparatus. As sticky as they tend to be in Saudi Arabia, however, they are seldom simple "dyads", but rather part of more complex networks of patronage in which clients themselves are patrons for actors further down in the hierarchy, clients can have several patrons, and links can shift over time, changing their utility as the context changes.
As we will see, the unmaking of a patron-client relationship can have dramatic In the early 60s, Nazer was reported to harbor progressive political attitudes, having expressed strong sympathies for Nasser. He managed to keep his head below the parapet when Tariki and other liberals were taken out, however. Some still suspected Nazer of being sympathetic to Tariki, and at least for a while he seemed to hedge his bets by being not too close to the royals. He managed to quickly gain new minister Yamani's trust, however, who decided to make him his deputy in 1962. 21 Nazer was described as an impressive figure, but with a tendency to be boorish and overbearing. 22 28 Taher would receive deputy ministerial rank, but only after Nazer. 29 Senior personnel of Aramco, the large US-owned oil concessionaire in the kingdom, consoled Taher: after all, the Petromin charter gave the new organisation an extensive mandate. 30 It would be responsible for all exploration, refining, and distribution of all petroleum and mineral resources in the kingdom that were not in the domain of then US-controlled oil concessionaire Aramco. 31 In line with Tariki's nationalist vision, a future role as national oil company was explicitly envisaged. 32 Petromin was supposed to become a governmental equivalent of Aramco -the implicit idea being that it could one day take its place. 33 These were the days of budding NOC ambition across the developing world: The Indonesian government had created national oil distribution and exploration companies in 1957 and 1961 respectively (later Venezolana de Petróleos in 1962, 35 and the Algerian regime created Sonatrach in 1963. 36 Different from most other oil states, Petromin was not set up in an atmosphere of feverish nationalism. Its inception rather came at a point of time when Faisal had clamped down on progressive Arab nationalists in the Saudi government, ushering in an era in which the conservative state dominated the anemic public politics of the kingdom. 37 Yet, Petromin itself looked much like its peers in socialist-progressive oil exporters, following the statist development paradigm of the day: run as a state agency rather than an incorporated company, with a government-approved operating budget rather than its own capital basis. 38 Taher, who remained on close terms with Yamani, warmed up to Petromin's promise. He was given considerable leeway by the minister and interpreted the institution's mandate very broadly. 39 The organisation became the main vehicle of Saudi industrialisation efforts for the coming decade. Its activities included minerals projects, 40 oil and gas exploration in areas relinquished by Aramco, 41 and distribution of gas and refined products within the kingdom. 42 Petromin also started its own oil shipping operations. 43 Even more ambitiously, Taher initiated a raft of heavy industry ventures, recognizing that the local merchants and contractors were in no shape to undertake industrialisation of any significant scale by themselves. Petromin started petrochemical projects, 44 oil refineries in Saudi Arabia and abroad, 45 glass 46 and steel 47 plants as well as power generation projects. 48 Although projects usually involved foreign partners, the Petromin shares were 50 per cent or more. 49 Needless to say, Aramco at the time was 100
per cent US-owned, and Tariki's talk of participation had been quashed by Faisal.
As Petromin was under the umbrella of the Faisal-Yamani partnership, it also got to take care of Faisal's most promising son, Saud Al-Faisal, who had returned from the US with a Princeton B.Sc. in economics in the mid-60s. Yamani reportedly thought it good idea to 'teach him business', 50 Whatever Petromin's virtues in readying Faisal's progeny for higher office, in its industrializing plans, it seemed to have bitten off more than it could chew. With national infrastructure badly underdeveloped and an acute lack of qualified manpower, most of its projects seemed to come too early in Saudi development to be viable. 53 Moreover, Taher, Petromin's unquestioned supremo, seemed to pursue an idiosyncratic recruitment policy. 54 Many Petromin employees appeared underqualified. 55 It has been speculated that the governor, who was 'jealously guarding his own preserve', 56 would not tolerate subordinates who were too smart. In any case, despite rapidly growing employment, Petromin's administrative structure remained ill-defined, with Taher maximizing control over operations. 57 The organisation's development reflected a general pattern of politicized or cronyist recruitment in the majority of developing country NOCs which, depending on the system, tended to serve the political needs of military elites, ruling family cronies, or powerful oil workers' unions (in the extreme case of Mexico's PEMEX leading to the sale of jobs by union bosses, known as "vendeplazas"). 61 Aramco analysts soon detected a potential rivalry between the CPO and Petromin. 62 As head of CPO, Nazer reportedly had direct access to the king, and soon started working on the kingdom's first development plan, which had a considerable industrial component. 63 Nazer also started rearing his own protégés, sending senior CPO staff Faisal Bashir and Fayez Badr to the US to get their PhDs. 64 At the same time, he successfully recruited Stanford Research International experts to help him in assembling his plan. 65 Yamani, although still on good terms with Nazer, supposedly did not share all MOPM information with him. 66 The Shell, 70 , Dow and Mobil. 71 Large steel mills were planned with BHP and Marcona, 72 and a gigantic gas gathering and liquefaction project was envisaged for the Eastern Province. 73 Plans for a trans-Arabian oil pipeline to a new industrial complex at the Red Sea port of Yanbu were agreed with Mobil in 1974. 74 Petromin also undertook the marketing of growing amounts of crude made available by Aramco in the course of "participation" negotiations. 75 The latter seemed to move the organisation closer to an ambition it had developed after the regional climate 78 Unsurprisingly, the numbers bandied about by Fahd, Yamani and Nazer were at variance, as MOPM, Petromin and CPO operated with little coordination. 79 The Petromin plan tackled every conceivable sector of industry: refining, gathering and liquefication of gas, mining, petrochemicals, fertilizers, iron, steel, aluminium manufacture for local and export markets, as well as transport and distribution of various petroleum products. The flagship projects were three (potentially four) large export refineries, and up to seven ethylene-based petrochemical plants, mostly on jointventure basis. 80 In practice, Petromin still had not got far by the mid-70s. 81 Its international negotiation partners pointed out that most of the large ventures would only be marginally economic. Petromin seemed to have no conception of the magnitude of potential problems and bottlenecks and relied on a faulty assumption of unlimited gas supplies. 82 Shipping refined products would be expensive -an issue Petromin planners never seemed to come to grips with -and Petromin lacked capital to build up distribution networks in consumer countries.
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Turn of the Tide in 1975
None of this was worse than the teething problems of other national oil companies, which have tended to be overambitious, politicized and lacking in administrative capacity.
Nonetheless, Petromin had to stomach its first big political defeat soon after the announcement of its five year plan. Faisal's death would accelerate economic development, but it also led to a significant shift of political forces in the technocracy. Petromin, whereas petrochemicals and mining would be assigned to the new ministry, with all projects transferred accordingly. Petromin, the budding champion of national industrialisation, was now effectively restricted to marketing, refining, and distribution of oil. 87 It had gone through a similar wing-clipping as Indonesia's Pertamina, which lost its non-oil business in the second half of the 1970s after incurring spectacular losses.
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Ghazi al-Gosaibi later complained about Petromin's (read: Yamani's and Taher's) obstinacy, which was not ready to surrender anything to another ministry and was the main obstacle in setting up the MOIE. 89 The flipside of the story is that Gosaibi Taher's and Nazer's rivalry had also badly escalated by the mid-70s, 112 as Nazer Taher still had the hope that the regional trend towards nationalisation would make
Petromin the default actor in the Saudi oil upstream, on which it now could arguably concentrate. The Saudi government had started to buy stakes in Aramco from its US parent companies in 1972, 114 and two years later Aramco appointed its first Saudi vice president. Saudi control over upstream assets seemed in reach.
Ironically, however, the takeover negotiations seemed to be going a bit too well from Petromin's point of view. In lieu of aggressive nationalisation, the Saudi government negotiated for consensual "participation". 115 By ceding company ownership rights, the Aramco parents could evade giving up managerial control over upstream assets. To create a Saudi interest in preserving Aramco's integrity, the company introduced increasing numbers of Saudis into its management, training them for executive positions. 116 Hoping to maintain their leading roles in what was one of the best-run companies in the Middle East, these US-educated Saudis evolved to be the most committed anti-Petromin group in the kingdom. 117 In all of OPEC, this group seems comparable only to the PDVSA oil executives in Venezuela, nationals who had mostly worked in international oil company (IOC) operations before the national champion was created in 1977. 118 Aramco insiders seemed to feel around 1976 or 1977 that Petromin was unlikely to become the supreme oil company in the kingdom. 119 As the takeover of Aramco ownership was handled relatively smoothly, the threat of building up Petromin as a fullblown national alternative was less and less required. The issue rather became how to organize the coexistence of Petromin and Aramco.
Petromin still made the news regularly, and the scale of its projects continued to grow. 120 Mobil built the Petroline cross-Arabian pipeline for it in the late 1970s, using more than 400.000 tons of pipe. 121 Petromin spent hundreds of millions of dollars on its domestic distribution facilities 122 and expanded its lubricants joint ventures. 123 Three
Petromin was finally given ministerial status. 125 Formally, Taher had caught up with Nazer. The Petromin expansion happened in parallel with that of other developing country NOCs such as PEMEX, Sonatrach or Pertamina, which expanded to become large fiefdoms in the boom years, usually run by politically well-connected executives. 126 In the late 1970s, Petromin's international oil sales business was sustained on a high level of between 1.5 and 2 million barrels per day. A flurry of sales deals were negotiated with various states and international oil companies. 127 As much of a success as this was in terms of assuming an NOC role, it is in distribution that Petromin acquired a reputation for large-scale improbity. As the organisation was responsible for contract details, and setting exact prices, leeway for discretion and commission-taking was large. 128 Yamani had previously convinced Faisal to kill 'princely oil' 129 , but several royals re-emerged as middlemen in Petromin deals. 130 Official and actual sales volumes were reported to be at variance. 131 The international oil sales business at the time was almost uniformly shot through with middlemen and commission payments: 132 Nigerian NNPC, Pertamina, Sonatrach and others, although operating in different political environments, all tended to "cut in" powerful players in their deals. 133 Nonetheless, Petromin's intransparency, and Taher's own increasing wealth, gave ammunition to Petromin's critics. In 1979, Petromin gained international notoriety when it was reported that Italian state oil company ENI agreed to pay a 115 million dollar commission for an oil supply contract. More than half the money was to be paid to Italian politicians and the rest to Saudi officials, among them Petromin functionaries. 134 As a government-to-government contract was at stake, the Saudi government felt exposed. 135 Similar deals involving other West European customers were rumoured or exposed briefly afterwards. An oil sales deal with West German Avia involved sales of 100.000 barrels/day, and a variety of commissions: 17 cents per barrel for Yamani (who could rely on Taher to flesh out the details), a slightly smaller cut for Taher, and a much larger one -possibly a dollar -for a senior prince. 136 Although Aramco had its own corruption scandal in 1977/78 -on a gas gathering project originally conceived by Petromin 137 -this came to be seen as an exception, and was dealt with by dumping chairman Frank Jungers. Aramco as organisation had been widely insulated from local politics. Petromin's opacity and its de facto role as slush fund for well-connected players appeared chronic by comparison. Taher's reputation suffered.
Defeat in 1983
It probably caused considerable anxiety among some Saudi Aramcons when Taher announced in 1980 that Aramco would soon be taken over by a national company. 138 By that year, Aramco had four Saudis on its board: Yamani, Taher and two MOPM deputies.
More importantly, it had become 100 per cent Saudi-owned. 139 However, 'no one quite knew what that meant', 140 as the company remained incorporated in Delaware and the chairman an American. 141 This gave Taher, opportunity for some blustering. In April 1982, the Middle East Economic Digest reported that he was likely to be named head of a national oil company which would be formed soon, despite considerable resistance in the Supreme Petroleum Council. His chances were rated high as he was the default candidate and a clear alternative plan for reorganizing the oil sector was lacking. 142 Yamani reportedly backed Taher's candidacy. 143 At the same time, trade journals expressed concern that a merger with Petromin could affect the efficiency of Aramco. Petromin, as was delicately put, had 'developed along more traditional Saudi lines' 144 . By the early 80s, it had grown to a bureaucratic behemoth, planning to employ a further 12.000 staff by 1985. 145 Most of its operations did not turn a profit, and the completion of its large refinery projects was delayed time and again.
Taher's moment of near glory was rather brief. In August 1982, speculations were reported that Aramco would be allowed keep more autonomy 146 -which probably had been the (unreported) default scenario since about 1977. Fahd was sitting out the difficult decision of how to concretely organize Saudi control over Aramco, but he was unlikely to have seriously considered giving the supreme job to Taher.
In November 1983, Ali Naimi was appointed president of Aramco, having previously been executive vice president oil and gas affairs. 147 Naimi was a quintessential
Aramco-reared oil functionary, having been an employee of the company since the tender age of 11, and having been sent to the US to study on an Aramco scholarship. While
American John Kelberer remained chairman and CEO, the Saudization of senior ranks within Aramco allowed the Saudi government to sustain its structure as enclave institution. 148 Further questions of reorganisation were effectively postponed. Different from many other oil states, in politically quiescent Saudi Arabia there was no public pressure towards nationalisation, making the cocooning of Western corporate structures politically palatable.
It is likely that senior Aramco management would have created a political crisis if the company had been forced to swallow the 'poison pill' of merging with Petromin, or of ceding any control over company strategy. 149 Saudi Aramcons worked as a domestic lobby group similar to the "Agropet" association of Venezuelan oil managers that successfully fought for a conservation of IOC managerial structures at the inception of PDVSA in 1977 (a victory that would prove less permanent than in the Saudi case). 150 Although the eventual shape of Aramco as national Saudi oil company remained unclear, by 1983 everyone with a more than fleeting interest in Saudi oil recognized that Petromin was, once again, out of the game.
Having benefited from ever growing development budgets during the oil boom decade, Petromin remained a vast organisation. Although Aramco also operated a large refinery at Ras Tanura, Petromin still was supposed to be the main Saudi refiner and marketer.
Three huge export refineries with a total capacity of 1.3 million barrels/day were being built with Mobil, Shell and Greek Petrola. 151 Due to a restrictive petroleum pricing policy, Petromin also had to step in as the main operator of Saudi gas stations (opening another avenue for Taher's own business interests).
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The oil crunch after 1982 by default increased Petromin's share in the international marketing of Saudi oil. Public diplomat Yamani and his technician Taher remained personally involved. During the lengthy OPEC meetings of the early 80s, Yamani reportedly concluded oil sales deals with advance knowledge of newly agreed prices, operating through a company registered in Gibraltar called "Evergreen". Together with a second-generation royal, Yamani and Taher were major stakeholders in the SaudiEuropean Bank in Paris, which was used mainly for recycling oil rents. 153 Taher, who through his managerial position was more involved in the nitty-gritty of rent-seeking than Yamani, was also known for hiring barges to transport unaccounted oil to tankers waiting offshore (a practice still widespread in Nigeria). 154 Much of this might have been tolerated as royals were often involved to gain political cover -or would even initiate oil sales deals as in the case of the oil for planes swap in 1984, when Petromin was ordered to sell 34 million barrels of oil to pay for 10
Boeing 747s. Among industry insider, Rabigh was generally considered a 'lousy deal', with Latsis overcharging for a technologically unsophisticated plant. 160 The refinery suffered from endless construction delays and cost overruns and would not start production until 1990. 161 Against the background of oil crash-induced austerity in the mid-1980s, it killed Petromin's credibility as refining company. The output of refined products had only increased from 226,000 to 349,000 barrels per day between 1970 and 1984, a negligible increase compared to the resources poured into Petromin. 162 The collapse of the oil price in 1985/86 also killed something else for good: Zaki
Yamani's career. Fahd, long trying to circumscribe the oil minister's influence, took Saudi Arabia's failure to maintain OPEC discipline as reason to relieve him of his duties on 29 October 1986. Yamani learned of his dismissal on TV.
Cleaning Up: 1986-93
Fahd's loyal client Hisham Nazer had been rumoured as Yamani's successor as early as 1983. 163 In 1986 his turn had come. Abdulhadi Taher's long-time patron was replaced by one of his worst rivals. Nazer had become Taher's boss.
Nazer initially was appointed on an interim basis, which led some observers to speculate that Taher might actually be in the ascendancy. 164 In December however, in the middle of an OPEC meeting, Taher was sacked. Nazer got his permanent appointment briefly afterwards. 165 In April 1987, both Yamani and Taher were removed from the Aramco board. 166 Taher was succeeded by his deputy Jamal Jawa, who himself resigned a few months later.
After oil price had somewhat stabilized, Nazer tackled the tortuous reorganisation of the oil sector which would finally lead to the death of Petromin. The meandering path the remake took is testament to the stickiness of institutions in Saudi Arabia, even those which have outlived their political purpose.
In November 1988, a royal decree finally created "Saudi Aramco", which was to own and operate the former Aramco assets. 167 Nazer became its first Saudi chairman. 168 The king also set up a Supreme Council for the company, chaired by himself, which would approve the Saudi Aramco's 5-year plans and annual reports as well as appoint the company's president at the recommendation of its board of directors. The 1990/91 Gulf war accelerated developments. Saudi Arabia's contribution to the allied war effort consisted to a significant degree of jet fuel provided to the US for free, produced by Samarec refineries. 180 In the meantime, domestic fuel was sold for hardly more than production costs, preventing Samarec from turning a profit.
Nazer begged the king to raise fuel prices so that Samarec could become viable.
After the war, however, cautious Fahd encountered organized political opposition for the first time in his tenure. He was in no mood to squeeze Saudi consumers. In a traditional gesture of paternal largesse, he instead lowered domestic gasoline and utility prices in 1992.
Samarec was effectively bankrupt, owing Aramco large amounts of money for the crude the latter had supplied to its refineries. 181 It could not even cover its operating costs. As a consequence, in June 1993, Fahd decreed that the Samarec mongrel -which had never been formally incorporated -be dissolved and its assets taken over by Where are Aramco and Petromin located in the larger universe of NOCs? The table above classifies NOCs of major developing country oil exporters on which sufficient information is available. Based on the case history of the two Saudi NOCs, combined with the literature on other cases, I argue that two major questions determine the shape of the nationalisation process and of the resulting NOC: First, is the relationship with incumbent IOCs antagonistic -usually driven by resource nationalism and populist ideologies -, or do IOCs and governments cooperate in the transfer of upstream assets?
Secondly, is the NOC that takes over politically insulated or shot through with social and political interests?
As the empty upper left corner shows, a conflict-ridden nationalisation seems to prevent the emergence of an insulated NOC organisation: Resource nationalism politicizes the upstream sector -moving cases to the lower left corner so to speak -and tends to give stakes in the new entity to unions (PEMEX, Sonatrach) or populist political groups (KPC, NIOC). This reinforces the above point that the preservation of Aramco's American managerial structures would not have been thinkable in a nationalistic political environment.
Conversely, however, low nationalism does not guarantee insulation: Petromin was created by a conservative, authoritarian state that suppressed populist and nationalist ideologies very effectively; resource nationalism was muted. Similarly, Venezuela, Indonesia and Nigeria avoided an all-out clash with IOCs. In all these cases, however, NOCs have been politicized (intermittently in the case of Venezuela, consistently in the other cases).
The two bottom corners contain very different entities. Being "politicized" for our purposes indeed can mean very different things: elite cronyism, fiscal exploitation, political capture by unions, all-out corruption, populist attacks by the regime etc. But the bottom line is that the company is shot through by social interests. As a result, efficiency tends to suffer.
It is only in cases in which nationalisation was a cooperative process and the new NOC has been politically insulated that reasonable degrees of efficiency have been reached. Aramco is the ideal type case. PDVSA in its early years comes pretty close, as does Abu Dhabi's ADNOC (which however is a shell company for joint ventures with
IOCs rather than an operationally autonomous organisation 191 ). PDVSA and Aramco are generally rated among the most efficient NOCs, considerably above their OPEC peers. 192 Thanks to its inherited capacities, the reluctantly nationalized Aramco nowadays ironically is the one NOC that does not have to denationalize by letting IOCs back into the upstream. Alone among NOCs, it is capable of managing upstream capacity expansion by itself.
Saudi Arabia could not have built up an Aramco-like organisation from scratchwhen it tried to build local structures through Petromin, it failed. The low level of resource nationalism however allowed it to preserve the foreign assets in the nationalisation process. As the cases in the bottom right corner show, this was not an automatic outcome: Political interventions in NOC budgets, prices, investment, appointments etc. are common also in cases in which nationalisation was not accompanied by anti-IOC populism. Nationalism is not the only cause of politicisation. In many cases, the rent-seeking interests of small elites undermined institution-building, be it shifting coalitions of military rulers and senior bureaucrats in Nigeria, or the longlasting alliance of Suharto and Pertamina's Dr. Ibnu Sutowo in Indonesia. 193 The crucial role of elite decisions in the very different Saudi story is all the more striking, in particular Fahd's moves on Aramco and Petromin. There was nothing that determined the preservation of the former and the demise of the latter other than the vagaries of a few princes and technocrats, in a variable mix of jealousy and administrative acumen.
